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Abstract 
We investigate whether the theory of strategic voting can explain voting behavior in a fairly 
common type of political system, multi-party systems with proportional representation, minimum 
vote thresholds, and coalition governments. In this paper, we develop a formal (computational) 
strategic voting game and show in a simulation that the model produces election scenarios and 
outcomes with desirable characteristics as well as different opportunities for strategic voting. We 
then test the decision-theoretic model in a laboratory experiment, taking into account both 
sophisticated and heuristic decision strategies. Participants with a purely instrumental (financial) 
motivation voted in a series of 25 independent elections. The availability of polls and coalition 
signals by parties was manipulated. The results show that voters are frequently able to make 
optimal or strategic vote decisions, but that voters also rely on simple decision heuristics and are 
highly susceptible to coalition signals by parties. 
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Strategic Voting 1
Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation and Coalition Governments: A 
Laboratory Experiment 
 
Strategic voters face a dilemma in the voting booth. Casting a ballot for the preferred 
party might be a sincere expression of one’s political preference but fail to influence the 
formation of the next government. The solution in the classic strategic voting scenario—a 
plurality election in a single member district with three choices—is to vote strategically for the 
second preference with the better chances (Cox 1997, Fisher 2004). According to the theory of 
strategic voting, a strategic vote requires an instrumental motivation and is based on rational 
expectations about the outcome of the next election. By definition, it is insincere. 
The strategic voting literature has focused on the influence of different institutional 
settings and electoral rules on strategic voting. These rules determine not only how voters pick a 
winning party or candidate in their local electoral district but also whether a party will be 
represented at the national level, and whether a party will have a mandate (or at least a chance) to 
form a government after the election. Both theoretical (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks 1988, Myatt 
2007, Fey 1997, Tsebelis 1986) and empirical work (e.g. Abramson et al. 1992, 1995, Alvarez 
and Nagler 2000, Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 2006, Blais et al. 2001, Irwin and Van Holsteyn 
2002, 2003) address these questions. However, the extensive literature on strategic voting has, 
with few exceptions, ignored a crucial characteristic of parliamentary democracies. Most 
elections produce legislatures with more than three parties which then have to negotiate coalition 
governments. With coalition governments, the question of winning and losing not only takes on a 
different meaning for parties and voters but also requires different strategies than just following 
the well-known wasted-vote logic in the classic scenario: desert the preferred but hopelessly 
trailing party for the second choice with the better chances. The wasted-vote logic can still apply 
in systems using proportional representation, but primarily for small parties threatened by 
minimum vote thresholds (Gschwend 2007). Among the (multiple) winners are all those parties 
that become a member of the next coalition government. When casting a ballot, voters support a 
specific party but exert only indirect control over the formation of a coalition government. 
However, they do influence whether and how strong a party can participate in these negotiations. 
Compared to the comparatively easy decision in the classic three-party case, strategic voting in 
multiparty systems with coalition governments quickly becomes a highly complex and difficult 
decision task.  
Strategic Voting 2
The theory of strategic voting assumes that voters cast their ballot in order to maximize 
their expected utility which depends on their party preferences and expectations about the 
outcome of the next election (Cox 1997). In a multiparty system, the latter includes not only the 
expectation of how well the parties will perform in the upcoming election but also which 
coalitions might be formed after the election. If the theory of strategic voting is correct, voters 
rise to this challenge and maximize their expected utility by casting optimal votes even under 
these difficult circumstances. It is possible, even likely, that voters use simple heuristics to reduce 
the complexity of the decision task, for example by paying attention to coalition signals by the 
parties. The latter can help voters to identify potential coalition governments (Gschwend 2004: 
92, Linhart 2007).  
This study puts the theory of strategic voting to a test by placing voters in challenging but 
ideal conditions for strategic voting. These conditions require that voters face decision scenarios 
which not only provide opportunities for strategic voting (see Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 
2006) but allow voters to form rational expectations and to use simple heuristics, for example by 
providing access to polls and other (more or less) helpful information such as coalition signals.  
The vast majority of previous studies about strategic voting at the individual level are 
based on cross-sectional surveys, conducted before or after single elections (e.g., Abramson et al. 
1992, Alvarez and Nagler 2000, Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 2006, Blais et al. 2001, Fisher 
2004, Lanoue and Bowler 1992, Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin 1992). Thus, it is very difficult to 
determine whether and how polls and other information affect the formation of rational 
expectations and result in vote decisions against the most-preferred party. First, it is more or less 
impossible to establish causality, particularly when the relationship between political preferences 
and expectations is not only unclear but possibly reciprocal (Babad 1995, Babad, Hills, and 
O’Diskroll 1992, Bartels 1988, Blais and Turgeon 2004, Dolan and Holbrook 2001, Gimpel and 
Harvey 1997, Granberg and Brent 1983, Johnston et al. 1992, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 
1944, Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1989, Mutz 1998). Second, looking at a single election usually 
does not provide much variation in the polls or possible coalitions. Consequently, it is not 
possible to conclude with confidence that a strategic voter would have decided differently if the 
polls had suggested a different election outcome or parties had offered different coalition signals.  
Laboratory experiments are an alternative research design that can establish causality by 
clearly separating cause and effect. The experimental approach allows a direct test of the 
theoretical assumptions about conditions and mechanisms of strategic voting. Instead of 
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recreating a realistic electoral environment in the laboratory that will activate pre-existing 
political preferences and biases (e.g., Meffert and Gschwend 2007), we chose the format of an 
economic experiment with theory-based, abstract, and context-free election scenarios. This 
approach allows the manipulation of contextual and “objective” causal factors for strategic voting 
such as party positions, party strengths, possible coalitions, and the availability of polls and 
coalition signals. The impact of these factors and that of simple decision heuristics on strategic 
voting can be systematically tested with instrumentally motivated voters (operationalized through 
monetary incentives). In short, the theory of strategic voting is tested in an experiment by 
observing voter behavior under ideal conditions for strategic decision making.  
Experimental Studies of Strategic Voting 
Strategic voting behavior has been studied in a variety of economic experiments, testing 
the impact of different decision rules (Cherry and Kroll 2003, Forsythe et al. 1996, Rapoport, 
Felsenthal, and Maoz 1991, Yuval and Herne 2005; also: Gerber, Morton, and Rietz 1998), pre-
election polls or similar information about preference distributions (Eckel and Holt 1989, Fisher 
and Myatt 2002, Forsythe et al. 1993, Forsythe et al. 1996, Plott 1991), voting histories (Forsythe 
et al. 1993, Williams 1991), Duverger’s law (Forsythe et al. 1993, Forsythe et al. 1996), 
sequential or repeated voting (Eckel and Holt 1989, Morton and Williams 1999, Williams 1991), 
and coalition governments (McCuen and Morton 2002, Goodin, Güth, and Sausgruber 2008), 
sometimes framed as a primary or general election and sometimes as a small group or committee 
decision making task. For the most part, these experiments focus on a very limited set of choices, 
usually three candidates or parties. These decision scenarios usually have formal solutions and 
know equilibria that allow a straightforward assessment of optimal decision making. 
Substantively, these studies have shown that (pre-election) polls are necessary for the formation 
of rational expectations and the successful coordination of voters (e.g. Forsythe et al. 1993, 
Forsythe et al. 1996, Plott 1991). The polls used in these studies are not always based on an 
actual poll of study participants but on the randomly assigned and thus known distribution of 
voters (e.g. Fisher and Myatt 2002, McCuen and Morton 2002). 
Unlike strategic voting experiments in the economic tradition, psychological experiments 
with realistic decision scenarios based on actual elections are very rare. As far as they exist (e.g. 
Geer et al. 2004, Meffert and Gschwend 2007), they show at best very weak support for behavior 
that conforms to the strict assumptions of strategic voting. However, the study by Meffert and 
Gschwend (2007) suggests that insincere voting is quite frequent in multiparty systems with 
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proportional representation, with coalition signals by parties as one of the reasons. In other 
words, some voters appear to be persuaded by strategic campaign information and behave 
accordingly. 
Among the economic experiments, there is virtually no study about elections with more 
than three choices, electoral rules using proportional representation and minimum vote 
thresholds, and coalition governments—a typical situation for parliamentary democracies. In an 
experiment on “tactical coalition voting” (TCV), McCuen and Morton (2002) come closest by 
addressing several of these aspects. The authors based their experiment on Austen-Smith and 
Banks’ (1988) formal model of coalition formation under proportional representation, with three 
parties competing in a one-dimensional space for 23 voters. Parties obtain seats proportional to 
their votes, but only if they pass a minimum vote threshold. A coalition is always formed by the 
largest and the smallest party unless a single party has a majority. Participants were randomly 
placed in the policy space and their payoff was dependent on the location of the new coalition 
government. The size of the thresholds and the availability of information were manipulated, and 
participants voted in a series of 20 independent elections. Results show that over two thirds of the 
participants behaved strategically as predicted by the model, but with a strong tendency to vote 
sincerely even if a strategic vote was predicted. Access to information was critical to facilitate 
strategic voting. 
TCV is based on an established theoretical model and makes clear predictions. It is 
essentially a modification of the classic strategic vote decision, a single member district with 
three choices, in which strategic voters should always vote for the second preference. However, it 
does not confront participants with decision scenarios that voters face in multi-party systems with 
multiple coalition options. The rule that the second preference is the optimal strategic choice does 
not apply anymore, and decisions scenarios are much more complex.  
Ironically, Rapoport, Felsenthal, and Maoz (1991) justify imposing considerable 
restrictions on admissible strategies (when modeling voting behavior) by pointing out that 
strategic voting requires considerable cognitive resources to perform the calculations necessary 
for successful decisions. In fact, the decision process might become so demanding that it 
becomes unreasonable to expect voters to succeed. If true, the theory of strategic voting would 
not have much to say about the most common political system in Western democracies, hardly a 
satisfying thought. And even more a reason to test the theory of strategic voting with a model that 
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captures key components of these systems while not overextending the cognitive capacities of a 
typical voter. 
The Strategic Voting Game Model 
Strategic voting in the classic three-candidate case is a comparatively straightforward 
decision. If the first choice cannot win, voting for the second choice with better chances will 
(might) produce the best possible outcome. In a multiparty system with proportional 
representation and coalition governments, the incentives and optimal choices for strategic voting 
can be quite different. The most obvious incentive for strategic voting is a minimum vote 
threshold that might prevent small parties from gaining seats, rendering such votes as “wasted” 
(assuming an instrumental motivation for voting). Even more important is the fact that voters 
have to consider all possible coalitions after an election, including the strength of the parties that 
might form a coalition (Linhart 2007). This puts all parties into play, and voting for the second 
choice is not necessarily the best strategic choice (see also Kedar 2005).  
A simple example, extreme but not implausible, can illustrate this point. In a fairly typical 
multiparty system, elections are often contests between two competing party blocs on the left and 
the right, each consisting of a major and a small party. A median voter, however, might prefer a 
grand coalition of the two moderate major parties. One way to reach this goal would be a vote for 
an extreme party with no prospects of joining a coalition with moderate parties. This would 
(might) weaken the preferred major parties, but at the same time force them to enter a grand 
coalition. In short, strategic voting in multiparty systems with coalition governments is not a 
simple choice between first and second preference but might involve any of the parties, or even 
strategic abstention. Identifying the optimal vote decision quickly becomes a highly challenging 
task.  
Given the lack of research and/or formal models for electoral systems with more than 
three parties, electoral thresholds, proportional representation, and coalition governments, a new 
and different model is required to capture the key components and characteristics of these fairly 
common political systems. Model building was guided by four key principles or assumptions. 
First, the party system must include at least four parties to provide multiple, non-trivial 
opportunities for coalition formation. Second, voters must always know their own policy 
preferences, the policy positions of the parties, and have a general idea about the strength of the 
parties (at least whether they are large or small). Knowledge of the precise pre-electoral strength 
of the parties, however, should depend on access to pertinent information such as polls. Third, 
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voters must know the precise rules of government formation. A voter familiar with the party 
positions and access to accurate polls should always be able (in theory) to determine the optimal 
vote decision. Fourth, voters must have a purely instrumental motivation for decision making, 
ruling out any expressive motivation. Compared to a sincere vote decision, they must benefit 
from successful strategic voting but pay a price for failed strategic voting that elects or 
strengthens less preferred or oppositional parties in government. 
Following these guiding principles, our strategic voting game model consists of four 
parties that compete for 15 voters in a two-dimensional policy space. Voters are free to cast a 
ballot for any of the four parties or to abstain from voting. Parties have to pass a minimum vote 
threshold (10%, or 2 votes) to obtain seats in parliament. Government formation follows four 
sequential rules: 
1) Absolute Majority: The party with more than 50% of the seats wins. If no party obtains 
an absolute majority, the formation of a coalition government with an absolute majority is 
necessary. 
2) Minimum Distance: If more than one coalition has more than 50% of the seats, the 
coalition with the (two or three) parties closest to each other wins. 
3) Minimum Number of Parties: If two coalitions have an absolute majority and the same 
distance, a two-party coalition beats a three-party coalition. 
4) Minimum Seat Share: If two coalitions have an absolute majority, the same distance, 
and the same number of parties, the coalition with the lower seat share (if more than 50%) 
wins. 
It should be noted that the first two rules are usually sufficient to produce a government. In case 
all four rules fail to produce a government, the election ends in a stalemate and a new election is 
called. The exact location of a coalition government in the two-dimensional policy space depends 
on the strength (number of votes) of the member parties, or in other words, represents the 
weighted average of the member party locations.  
Voters maximize their expected utility if the new government is located as close as 
possible to their own position. Thus, a voter casts a ballot with the goal of influencing the 
location of the new government. The success or failure of the vote decision is determined relative 
to the default decision, a sincere vote for the preferred or closest party. Payoff points are a linear 
function of the movement of the government in the two-dimensional policy space (with a length 
and width of 100 units or points). If a voter can move the location of the new government closer 
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to his or her location (compared to the location of the government if a sincere vote is cast), the 
reduced distance represents a positive payoff. If, however, a vote for a party other than the 
preferred party increases the distance between the government and the voter (compared to a 
sincere vote), the size of the increased distance is the price (in payoff points) the voter has to pay. 
A sincere vote for the preferred party is always a save choice and results in zero payoff points 
(with one exception described below).  
Depending on the circumstances in a given election, there are up to three mechanisms 
how a voter might affect government formation. A vote might influence (1) whether a party can 
pass the minimum vote threshold to gain seats, (2) whether a coalition will reach an absolute 
majority, and (3) the strength (or weight) of a party in a coalition. A strategic vote might lead to a 
new or different coalition or merely readjust the weights of the parties within an existing 
coalition. We distinguish these two decisions as classic strategic voting and strategic coalition 
voting.  
The locations of parties and voters are randomly generated for each election. For 
theoretical and practical reasons, the placements of parties and voters in the election scenarios 
used in the laboratory experiment were subject to three restrictions. First, each voter has only a 
single preferred or closest party, ruling out ties. Second, there is a minimum distance between 
each pair of parties (10 units horizontally and vertically), ensuring that all parties and the 
distances between them are clearly visible in the graphical display of the game space. Third, the 
strength of each party ranges between one and seven supporters, ruling out that a party has either 
no support at all (and thus hardly any chance of being represented in parliament), or that it 
already has an absolute majority from the start.  
It should be noted that a small electorate with 15 voters is necessary to create election 
scenarios in which individual votes can make a tangible difference. In real elections, only groups 
of voters can produce a similar impact. Psychological evidence indeed suggests that voters not 
only project their own choices on voters with similar preferences (“voter’s illusion”) but also tend 
to believe that their own vote matters (Acevedo and Krueger 2004). In short, individual voters in 
our model represent groups of voters that, if they follow a similar decision logic, can produce 
meaningful electoral shifts.  
Before addressing alternative decision strategies and the laboratory experiment in more 
detail, a simulation will demonstrate key characteristics of the model and decision scenarios.  
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Simulation 
The goal of the simulation is to show what kind of party system and what kind of 
governments result from the model, including an assessment of the opportunities for strategic 
voting. The simulation varies two parameters to produce six different scenarios. First, it varies the 
size of the minimum vote threshold required to obtain seats in parliament from none (equal to a 
single vote requirement) to 10% (2 votes) and 17.5% (3 votes). Second, the randomly produced 
election scenarios are either free of any restrictions or subject to the three conditions about 
minimum party distances and party strength outlined above. For each scenario, the outcomes of 
100,000 simulated elections were summarized. Any ties during government formation were 
broken randomly, and all voters voted sincerely unless indicated otherwise. 
The party system produced by the model can be described by showing the average 
number of parties represented in parliament (Figure 1). According to the model, three to four 
parties usually have seats in parliament. Only in the scenario with the highest threshold and no 
restrictions, the model starts to produce a small number of single party systems. In the scenario of 
interest (with restrictions and a 10% threshold), the number of parties is mostly four (59%), 
followed by three (39%) and quite rarely by just two parties (2%). In short, this scenario produces 
the desirable multiparty system in which a single party will often fail the minimum threshold. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Government formation can be described by the average number of parties in government 
(Figure 2). According to the model, two-party coalitions are the most frequent outcome. Only in 
the extreme scenario with a 17.5%-threshold and no restrictions, single party governments are the 
most frequent outcome, mostly due to the smaller number of parties represented in parliament. As 
before, the scenario of interest (with restrictions and a 10%-threshold) produces the most 
desirable outcomes. Even though two-party coalitions dominate (96%), both three-party 
coalitions (2%) and single-party governments (2%) are possible.1  
[Figure 2 about here] 
So far, the simulation results assume that all voters vote sincerely. The results would 
obviously change if one (or more) voters would cast a strategic vote. In fact, the most interesting 
                                                 
1 Given an electorate with 15 sincere voters, a single party government is possible if two parties 
with a single vote each fail to obtain seats in parliament. One of the remaining parties will have 
an absolute majority with seven votes, beating the opposition party with just six votes. 
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question is the extent to which the model produces opportunities for strategic voting. This 
question can be assessed by determining whether a strategic vote (or strategic abstention) would 
result in a positive payoff by moving the government closer to the voter. Only one voter is 
assumed to vote strategically while the other 14 voters behave sincerely. Figure 3 summarizes the 
results by distinguishing further between classic strategic voting (a strategic vote produces a 
different coalition or government compared to a sincere vote) and strategic coalition voting (the 
vote merely changes the weight of the parties in a given coalition). The results show that there are 
many more opportunities for strategic coalition voting than classic strategic voting, but that a 
higher minimum vote threshold increases the latter while decreasing the former. This can be 
explained by the fact that more parties are affected by a higher threshold, because it produces a 
smaller party system. As a result, the number of single-party governments increases. In the 
scenario of interest, nearly every second election provides an opportunity for strategic voting, 
whether classic strategic voting (14%) or strategic coalition voting (33%).  
[Figure 3 about here] 
In summary, our model produces a party system and coalition governments that not only 
have the desired properties but also provide plenty of opportunities for strategic voting. The 
election scenarios used in the experiment below are drawn from the reference category with 
restrictions in place and a 10% minimum vote threshold. 
Sophisticated vs. Heuristic Decision Making 
According to the theory of strategic voting, voters have the single-minded instrumental 
goal of maximizing their expected utility. This assumes and requires a sophisticated and elaborate 
decision making process. Voters have to know and use information about parties’ policy 
positions and their expected electoral strengths to determine the optimal vote decision. Previous 
studies, whether survey-based or experimental, show that the number of voters who appear to 
vote strategically is rather small (e.g. Fisher 2004, Meffert and Gschwend 2007; but see also: 
Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 2006). In addition, the mere observation of a strategic vote is not 
necessarily evidence that a voter did engage in a sophisticated decision process. The theory of 
strategic voting defines strategic voters only post hoc by the electoral decision for a less preferred 
party, not a priori by the decision making process—which most of the time might very well lead 
to the conclusion that a vote for the preferred party is optimal. Apparently strategic voting 
behavior might also have much simpler explanations. Contextual cues such as coalition signals 
sent out by parties could facilitate or induce strategic voting, or voters might rely on simple 
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heuristics such as avoiding weak, isolated, or distant parties that, all else being equal, will usually 
not play a decisive role in government formation. Sophisticated and heuristic decision modes do 
not necessarily exclude each other. In fact, the latter might even help to reduce the complexity of 
the decision task to likely solutions, but the former mode will be necessary to detect and override 
any misleading cues or shortcuts. In short, both types of decision making have to be considered 
when analyzing strategic voting in complex election scenarios.  
Coalition Signals 
In multiparty systems with coalition governments, parties usually make announcements 
about potential and possible coalitions after the next election. These announcements might range 
from an ambiguous “no comment” to explicit statements in favor or against specific coalitions. 
These statements signal intentions but lack certainty because only the election result will 
determine with certainty whether specific coalitions are possible. One particular type of (positive) 
coalition signal is of primary interest here because it explicitly appeals to voters to cast a strategic 
vote. For example, German coalition governments usually include a major and a small party, with 
the latter occasionally threatened by the minimum vote threshold. When that happens, the parties 
often appeal to supporters of the strong and secure major party to cast a “rental vote” 
(Leihstimme) in favor of the small party, securing not only parliamentary seats for the junior 
coalition partner but a majority for the coalition itself. Survey (Gschwend 2007, Pappi and 
Thurner 2002) and experimental (Meffert and Gschwend 2007) evidence suggests that voters 
follow these appeals even if polls and/or voter expectations do not suggest that such behavior is 
necessary.  
As a consequence, it is reasonable to expect that voters take note and sometimes follow 
such positive coalition signals. If such a signal covers the (from the perspective of the voter) 
optimal government coalition, merely following the coalition signal can be sufficient to cast a 
successful strategic vote. If a signal points in the wrong direction, however, blindly following this 
misleading cue might lead to suboptimal or even very harmful vote decisions. 
Simple Heuristics 
Strategic voters might also rely on simple contextual cues. Given the basic motivation to 
avoid casting a wasted vote, voters might quickly eliminate parties from further consideration 
that have presumably disqualifying characteristics, either because they will not affect government 
formation at all or, even worse, increase the likelihood of a harmful (more distant) government. 
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Three such simple decision rules will be considered, each of them supported by simulation 
results: 
1) Avoid distant parties: As the distance of a party from the voter increases, the likelihood of a 
positive payoff from casting a strategic vote for that party decreases while the likelihood of a 
negative payoff increases. The simulation reported above supports this contention. The closest 
party is most often the optimal decision (52.8%), followed by the second (28.1%), the third 
(15.1%), and the most distant party (2.1%).2 
2) Avoid isolated parties: A party that is isolated (relatively and visibly more distant) from the 
other parties is less likely to play any role in government formation. Formally, a party is defined 
as isolated if the sum of the distances to the other three parties is at least 20% larger than the 
(second highest) sum of distances of the next party. According to the simulation, isolated parties 
are only optimal in 4.4% of the scenarios overall, or in 11.3% of the elections when limited to the 
38.9% of election scenarios which include an isolated party. 
3) Avoid small parties: Small parties are less likely to play a decisive role in government 
formation, in particular because they might fail to pass the minimum vote threshold. According to 
the simulation, very small parties (with two or fewer supporters) are the optimal vote decision in 
only 14.2% of the election scenarios overall, or 16.6% of the elections when limited to the 85.4% 
of election scenarios which include small parties.  
Our simulation results illustrate that each of these three decision rules can be useful to 
reduce the complexity of the decision task, but neither is necessarily correct. In the following 
experiment, we test whether voters (can) use sophisticated and heuristic decision strategies in a 
game-based parliamentary democracy with proportional representation and coalition 
governments.  
Laboratory Experiment 
Election Scenarios  
Participants voted in a series of 25 independent elections. These election scenarios were 
drawn from a pool of potentially interesting elections, generated randomly with the restrictions 
described above. The pool of elections was narrowed down using three selection criteria: the 
difficulty of the elections (see below), the size of the payoffs (maximum gain or loss not 
                                                 
2 The percentages are based on the simulation for the reference category with restrictions and a 
10% threshold. In 1.9% of the election scenarios, strategic abstention is the only optimal choice. 
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exceeding 10 payoff points), and the type of decision necessary to obtain the maximum payoff (a 
classic strategic vote that produces a new/different coalition, a strategic coalition vote that 
changes the strength of the parties in an existing coalition, or a sincere vote for the preferred 
party). All participants voted in the same 25 election scenarios, but in a randomized order. 
Manipulation of Polls and Coalition Signals 
To investigate the impact of polls and coalition signals, the availability of these two 
critical information sources for strategic voting was manipulated. Polls were generated 
automatically based on the actual distribution of party preferences of the voters instead of 
conducting polls of the participants. Due to the applied restrictions, each party had between one 
and seven supporters. If poll information was available, voters saw the number and percentage of 
supporters for each party on the screen. However, even if the poll was not visible, participants 
were informed whether each party was a major party supported by more than 25% of the voters 
or a small party supported by less than 25% of the voters. Thus, voters would know with certainty 
that two large parties would always have an absolute majority of seats while two small parties 
would not be able to reach a majority (assuming sincere voting). Given the critical importance of 
polls for optimal vote decisions, the availability of polls was randomly assigned with a 
disproportionate probability (80% visible, 20% hidden), independently for each election round. 
Coalition signals, on the other hand, constitute supplementary information that may help 
to identify the next governing coalition but that can never guarantee that this particular coalition 
will have a majority after the election. Even if not successful, coalition signals have to be at least 
plausible to be seen as credible and taken seriously by participants. As a consequence, a random 
generation of coalition signals is not possible because it might lead to rather absurd signals, for 
example between the two most distant parties or between two small parties. Instead, coalition 
signals were produced by a simple decision rule. A signal always includes the two parties that are 
closest to each other, with at least one major party among them. In other words, the coalition 
signal represents a simple heuristic to identify a potential governing coalition. In “easy” elections, 
this simple heuristic will identify the optimal government for the voter. In “difficult” elections, 
this signal will not show the optimal government. Note that the signal is based on the location (or 
distances) and general strength of the parties, information that is always available to voters, even 
without a poll. Also note that while the signal might show the optimal government that will be 
formed, it does not necessarily include the optimal party choice of a voter. Because the coalition 
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signal is not necessary for an optimal decision, the availability of coalition signals was assigned 
with even probability (50% visible, 50% hidden), again independently for each election round. 
Participants 
Participants for the experiment were recruited by email from the participant pool of the 
experimental lab of the Collaborative Research Center (SFB 504) at the University of Mannheim, 
Germany. The average age of the 279 participants was 24, ranging from 17 to 47 years, 62.4% 
were male, and most were students enrolled in a variety of majors, but most frequently in 
business or economics. 
Procedure 
At the beginning of each session, participants were seated at separate computer terminals 
and given a short verbal introduction, announcing that each participant would play with (or 
against) simulated voters and how payoff points would be converted in a cash payoff at the end. 
The study continued on the computer and participants were able to proceed at their own pace.  
Participants first responded to a short version of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo 
and Petty 1982; agreement with 12 items about problem solving; α = .79) before they read a 
detailed explanation and instructions for the voting game, including a step-by-step explanation of 
all elements of the game screen (Figure 4). Before the game began, they had to pass a quiz testing 
knowledge and understanding of the rules of government formation or were returned to the 
beginning of the instructions. After passing the test, participants completed nine trial elections. 
After each trial election, participants could modify their vote to observe the effects of different 
decisions, view a list of the optimal choice(s), and read a short explanation of the optimal 
choice(s). In the subsequent 25 competitive elections, participants played for payoff points. They 
had 90 seconds to cast a vote in each election, and a failure to vote in time was counted as 
abstention. The “voting booth” opened after a short 5-second delay and showed a countdown for 
the last 10 seconds. Participants always saw their own location and the location of the four parties 
in the graphical display of the two-dimensional policy space. The preferred (closest) party was 
listed below the policy space as a reminder. While the status as major or small party was always 
visible, the availability of polls and coalition signals was randomized as described above.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
Participants had access to two optional information tools. One showed the exact 
(numerical) pairwise “party distances” and was helpful if the distances were hard to determine 
based on the graphical display. With the “distance calculator,” participants could obtain precise 
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information about the distances between their own location and possible government locations 
(individual parties or coalitions without any weighting for party strength). For coalitions, the 
calculator also showed the estimated intra-coalition distances, which are of interest primarily for 
three-party coalitions. 
Each election ended with the vote decision (or after 90 seconds) and participants saw the 
results of the election, including vote and seat shares for each party, the new government (which 
was also shown in the policy space), their vote decision, the payoff points earned or lost in the 
election, and the cumulative payoff points over all completed elections. On average, decisions 
required 30.7 seconds (SD=19.3, Median=26), and only 24 out of 6975 decisions (.3%) were not 
made in time. 
Participants earned or lost payoff points depending on their success of moving the 
government closer to or away from their own position, relative to the government position after a 
sincere vote. The possible gains ranged from .05 to 9.87 payoff points in different games, the 
losses ranged between -.04 and -8.31 points. In five elections, a sincere vote was also the optimal 
choice (with no positive payoff possible). For every optimal decision, participants received an 
additional bonus point that was added to the cumulative payoff points. The bonus points had two 
functions. They provided a positive payoff in the five elections in which the sincere vote was also 
the optimal vote, with no other opportunity to obtain a positive payoff. Second, by flagging 
optimal decisions, the bonus points also provided participants with limited feedback about their 
performance. 
Participants started with an initial endowment of 12 payoff points. At the end of the study, 
the payoff points were converted into a cash payout in Euro (1 payoff point = 25 Cents).3 A 
minimum payoff of €3 was guaranteed for completing the 25 elections and answering a short 
questionnaire. The average payoff was €9.55 (about $13). 
After voting in all 25 elections, participants answered two open-ended questions about 
their decision strategy and the usefulness of the graphical display, polls, and coalition signals. 
After a few demographic questions, participants responded to an open-ended 13-item political 
knowledge scale (Zaller 1992), asking about the jobs of various public officials (or vice versa) 
                                                 
3 The payoff function (initial endowment and conversion rate) was slightly modified for two 
small groups of participants, without affecting their voting behavior. Consequently, all groups 
were combined for the analyses.  
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and some questions about the political system (α = .81). Participants were thanked for their 
participation, debriefed, and collected their payoff upon leaving the lab. Participation in the 
computer-based part of the study took on average 52 minutes.  
Results 
Optimal Voting Performance over Time 
Starting with an overall aggregate assessment of participants’ performance over time, the 
share of optimal decisions increased only marginally from about 46 percent to 49 percent, or 
about half of the vote decisions (Figure 5). The learning effect is, as far as it exists, rather small. 
At the same time, however, the share of sincere preference votes declined significantly to 35% 
from 44%. Participants appear to have gained more confidence with repeated voting and 
increasingly attempted to vote strategically, but with limited success. Finally, the average 
decision time also dropped significantly from 34 to 27 seconds. This also suggests that 
participants were increasingly confident in their own decision making ability (though weariness 
and impatience might have played a role as well toward the end of 25 election rounds). In short, 
as participants gained experience and confidence, their overall ability to make optimal decisions 
increased only slightly to about half of the decisions. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Voting Performance by Difficulty and Information Sources 
A more detailed assessment of the voting performance including the impact of polls and 
coalition signals requires a differentiation according to the difficulty of the decision scenarios. 
Easy elections were associated with optimal coalition signals, or in other words, the question of 
government formation could be solved with an easy heuristic. Difficult elections were associated 
with suboptimal or misleading signals, that is, the question of government formation was less 
obvious and required a more careful assessment of the scenario. In order to assess the separate 
and combined effects of polls and coalition signals on optimal decisions, vote decisions were 
classified by the kind of information available to participants in a given election—none, polls 
only, coalition signal only, or polls and coalition signals combined. 
As expected, voters were much more successful casting optimal ballots in easy elections 
than in difficult elections (Figure 6 and Table 1). With all information available (polls and 
coalition signals), the share of optimal decisions reached 67.7% in easy and 37.6% in difficult 
elections. In easy elections, even voters with no access to information made optimal decisions at 
a rate of 51.7%. Access to polls or optimal coalition signals increased the success rate by more 
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than 10 percentage points to 64.2% and 64.8%, respectively. With both types of complementing 
information available, the success rate increased slightly further to 67.7%. The equivalent effects 
of polls and signals are remarkable. Whether using polls to actively determine possible 
governments or by merely following the coalition signal, voters were able to significantly 
increase the chance of casting an optimal vote.  
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Table 1 about here] 
Difficult elections posed a bigger challenge. Without any information, optimal ballots 
were cast with a success rate of only 30.9%, not much better than chance. Access to polls and 
suboptimal coalition signals had the expected opposite effects. As before, access to polls 
increased the success rate by about 10 percentage points to 40.8%. With only a suboptimal or 
misleading coalition signal available, the success rate dropped to a low of 21.8%. With both types 
of—in this case contradictory—information available, voters apparently gained the ability to 
discount the misleading signals and rather use the polls to reach a success rate of 37.6%.  
Voters were fairly successful at avoiding unquestionably wrong voting decisions that 
caused a loss of payoff points. Even under the most difficult circumstances—difficult elections 
with a misleading coalition signal but no poll information—only 22.7% of the decisions were 
unequivocally wrong. 
The evidence so far allows the following conclusions. First, polls appear to be a 
consistently helpful source of information for strategic voting. A lot of voters are able, even in 
difficult situations, to use poll information to make optimal vote decisions, or at least to avoid 
bad ones. Second, voters appear to be very receptive to coalition signals. As long as these signals 
provide accurate information, the heuristic of following this cue can successfully substitute for 
polls. In fact, polls are not even necessary in this case. However, if coalition signals lead in the 
wrong direction, this heuristic causes bad decisions. Strategic voters cannot rely on coalition 
signals alone. Finally, access to polls allowed voters to discount and counterargue misleading 
coalition signals. In summary, polls are a consistently helpful source of information for strategic 
voting while coalition signals can be sufficient under optimal circumstances but very harmful at 
other times. 
Overall, strategic voting had a high success rate in elections with fairly transparent 
decision scenarios. But once the question of government formation became more complicated, 
strategic voting became a challenging task with a rather low success rate as well.  
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Decision Making at the Individual Level 
Turning to individual voting decisions, the voting behavior of the participants was 
assessed in two ways, first by considering all choice options simultaneously and then by focusing 
on optimal vote decisions. 
Participants had five choices in each of the 25 elections, four parties and the option to 
abstain. Only one choice was optimal in most election scenarios. In two election scenarios, two 
choices were optimal and produced the same optimal government or maximum payoff. In total, 
participants faced 125 choice options, 22.4% with a positive payoff, 35.2% with a negative 
payoff, and 42.4% with no effect at all on payoffs.4  
Assuming identical decision behavior across all participants, vote decisions can only be 
based on choice-specific attributes. With one exception, the relevant predictors were 
operationalized with dichotomous indicators and tested with a conditional logit regression model. 
Preferred and optimal choice(s) are two self-explanatory indicators of the preferred party and the 
optimal choice(s) in a given election scenario. The impact of the latter is assumed to represent the 
outcome of a sophisticated, strategic decision process. The signal indicates that a party was 
named in the coalition signal and that the coalition signal was visible in a given election round. 
Three additional predictors represent the three simple heuristics discussed above. Distance 
indicates the relative distance of the non-preferred parties from the voter, above and beyond the 
distance of the preferred party (preferred party and abstention are set to zero). Isolated party 
indicates that a given party is relatively isolated (as defined above) from the other three parties. A 
small party indicates a party that had the support of two or fewer voters in the polls, or if no poll 
was visible, that was labeled as a “small” party. Because the election scenarios and the location 
of the parties were randomly generated, the effects are expected to be equal across all parties. To 
account for any potential choice-specific differences, four choice- or party-specific constants 
were included, using abstention as the baseline category. Because the visibility of polls is 
constant across choice-sets, a poll indicator is not directly included in the model. Instead, four 
separate models are estimated for easy and difficult elections, with polls either visible or not 
                                                 
4 If bonus points for optimal preference votes (with a zero payoff otherwise) are included as well, 
the share of choice options with a positive payoff increases to 27.2% while choice options 
without any effect on payoffs declines to 37.6%. 
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shown. The standard errors account for the clustering in the data (a cluster represents the 125 
choice options faced by each participant).  
The results show, and strongly confirm, that party preference, represented both by party 
distance and preferred party, played a decisive role in the elections. The relative distance measure 
is consistently significant in all four models. The larger the relative distance of non-preferred 
parties, the less likely they were chosen. With each point that the distance of a non-preferred 
party increases, the odds of choosing this party decreased by a factor between .94 (6%) and .96 
(4%), holding the values of the other alternatives constant (Table 2). The preferred party became 
a significant fallback option only for difficult elections. Without access to polls, voters were 
twice as likely to choose the preferred party. With polls, the odds of choosing the preferred party 
still increased by 16%.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The coalition signal was, next to the distance heuristic, the only other factor consistently 
significant for all election types. In particular without poll information, the odds of choosing a 
party in the signal more than doubled (2.72 for easy elections and 2.38 for difficult elections). 
Access to polls decreased the impact of coalition signals, but the odds for a party in the signal 
still doubled in easy elections and increased by 34% in difficult elections. Coalition signals by 
parties seem to be able to effectively cue and coordinate voters’ decision making.  
Voters were fairly successful in identifying optimal choices in all elections types, in 
particular if polls were available. Even without polls, the odds of selecting an optimal choice 
increased by 70% for easy elections and 44% for difficult elections. This suggests that 
participants were able, even without poll information, to make educated guesses about optimal 
choices. With polls available, the odds of an optimal choice more than tripled in easy elections 
and more than doubled in difficult elections. These effects confirm that poll information is crucial 
for successful strategic voting. 
The two other heuristics also confirm the expected effects. The heuristic of avoiding 
isolated parties was significant in three of the four models, reducing the odds of an isolated party 
between 46% and 70%. Small parties were avoided if they were clearly identifiable as such in 
polls, but not if they were only known or labeled as small without access to more precise polls. In 
easy and difficult elections, the odds of a small party decreased by 51%. Voters apparently used 
both heuristics to reduce the complexity of the decision task. Finally, the party-specific constants 
confirm that there were no systematic differences between the four party choices. 
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The vote choice model suggests that participants were able to engage in sophisticated 
decision making, though the success rate depended considerably on contextual factors such as 
polls and the quality of the coalition signal. This leaves the question whether all voters have the 
same ability to make optimal decisions, or whether individual differences—individual 
capabilities, knowledge, and behavior—play a role as well. To answer this question, the analysis 
shifts the focus from choice-specific explanations to voter-specific explanations and investigates 
the factors that facilitate optimal vote decisions. In the new model, the dichotomous dependent 
variable simply indicates whether or not a vote decision was optimal. The independent variables 
include three scenario-specific manipulations, the availability of polls and coalition signals as 
well as the election round. The latter represents the potential learning effect over time. The 
remaining six independent variables represent voter-specific attributes and behaviors. These 
include the decision time in seconds, the use of the two optional information tools (distance 
calculator and party distance matrix), the need-for-cognition (NFC) and political knowledge 
scores, and male sex of the voter. With the exception of sex, higher scores on these variables 
were expected to increase the likelihood of an optimal vote decision, either because they provide 
more opportunities and information for an optimal decision or because voters had better cognitive 
capacities for sophisticated decision making. The model was estimated separately for easy and 
difficult elections, and the standard errors account for the clustering in the data. 
The results confirm once more that poll information was crucial for making optimal 
decisions, improving the odds of optimal decisions by 37% for easy and 65% for difficult 
elections (Table 3). The coalition signal was also significant, but with opposite effects depending 
on the election type. Optimal signals in easy elections had a substantial positive impact (28%) 
while suboptimal signals in difficult elections lowered the odds of optimal decisions by 15%. 
Voters also showed a learning effect, but only for difficult elections. The odds of an optimal 
decision increased by one percent with each additional election round. For easy elections, no 
learning effect was found.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Among the voter-specific variables, decision time showed a similar conditional effect. 
Taking more time to cast a vote in difficult elections improved the odds of optimal decisions by 
one percent for each additional second, again with no beneficial effect for easy elections. The use 
of the two optional information tools showed differential effects. The use of the party distance 
matrix—indicating a careful assessment of information was critical for government formation—
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showed similar significant positive effects for easy and difficult elections. The use of the distance 
calculator tool, however, had no or, in the case of easy elections, a significant negative impact. It 
is highly unlikely that the latter effect indicates a causal relationship. It can rather be seen as a 
symptom of failing to solve the comparatively easy government formation task.  
The effects of the remaining three variables suggest that individual differences play a role 
in strategic voting, confirming similar findings for survey data (Gschwend 2007). Voters scoring 
higher on the NFC scale were more successful in making optimal decisions in difficult elections, 
increasing the odds by 17% for each additional scale point. Political knowledge, on the other 
hand, gave an edge in easy elections, increasing the odds of optimal decisions by 4% for each 
scale point. Rather surprisingly, male voters were more likely to cast optimal votes in easy 
elections (26%), with no remarkable sex differences in difficult elections. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The theory of strategic voting was tested at the micro-level and for a fairly common type 
of political system that is more or less absent in the pertinent experimental literature: multi-party 
systems with coalition governments and electoral rules that include proportional representation 
and minimum vote thresholds. With the notable exception of McCuen and Morton (2002), hardly 
any research has attempted to put the theory to a rigorous empirical and experimental test with all 
the noted conditions present. Our study demonstrates that this is not only possible, but that voters 
are frequently able to make strategic vote decisions even under fairly difficult conditions. Our 
study has five key findings. 
(1) The simulation shows that the strategic voting game model produces plausible party systems 
and coalition governments. With a few restrictions applied to party positions and voter 
preferences, the model shows that classic strategic voting or strategic coalition voting lead to 
positive payoffs in nearly half of the randomly produced election scenarios. 
(2) In the laboratory experiment, voters were able to make optimal vote decisions in nearly half 
of the elections, though the success rate depended considerably on the difficulty of the election 
scenario and the availability of helpful information. 
(3) Polls are a crucial information source and essential for the formation of rational expectations. 
Access to polls always facilitates better (more optimal) decisions. The effect of coalition signals, 
on the other hand, depends on their usefulness—something a voter cannot know in advance. 
Optimal coalition signals help and in fact can substitute for polls, while suboptimal signals make 
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optimal decisions more difficult. Only access to polls can prevent the negative impact of 
misleading coalition signals.  
(4) Strategic voters seem to rely on a number of heuristics to reduce the complexity of the 
decision task. Most of the time, the use of heuristics makes sense, but they cannot guarantee 
optimal decisions. Before casting a strategic vote, a sophisticated voter will always have to 
confirm the choice with poll-based information. 
(5) Individual differences matter. Because strategic voting is a challenging task, cognitive skills 
such as a (high) need-for-cognition or a (high) degree of political knowledge facilitate decision 
making and tend to increase the likelihood of optimal decisions. In addition, voters have to invest 
more time to make optimal decisions under difficult circumstances. 
The study has a number of implications. The consistent and strong impact of coalition 
signals suggests that the issue of coalition governments needs further attention. There is not much 
research on the impact of voters’ coalition preferences on voting behavior in general (e.g. Aldrich 
et al. 2004, Bargsted and Kedar 2007, Blais et al. 2006), and virtually no research on the impact 
of different types and kinds of coalition signals. Both factors might have considerable 
explanatory power, whether for strategic voting behavior (to maximize expected utility) or 
because genuine coalition preferences trump party preferences and lead voters to cast an 
“insincere” vote, no matter what the polls say.  
Voters are cognitive misers and will always try to make cognitively efficient decisions 
(Fiske and Taylor 1991). There is no reason to expect that strategic voters are fundamentally 
different. The use of heuristics makes sense even for strategic voters if it simplifies the decision 
task, but only if they are used with care and confirmed with better information. In short, 
sophisticated and heuristic decision making can complement each other. 
The generalizability of a laboratory experiment with artificial decision scenarios and 
student participants has limits. First, participants in the study did not have strong or fundamental 
party preferences that frequently guide voting behavior in real elections. Without strong party 
preferences, strategic voting becomes “easier.” While undoubtedly true, two aspects should 
compensate for this shortcoming. First, strategic voters by definition should only have an 
instrumental motivation to affect the formation of the next government. Whether that involves 
voting for the preferred party or some other party should not matter. Second, the strong effect of 
the party distance heuristic (see Table 2) clearly demonstrates that proximity matters and works 
against more distant and less preferred parties. Participants had to pay a real price—figuratively 
Strategic Voting 22
and literally speaking—for wrong decisions. In short, the distances in the strategic voting game 
can be seen as functionally equivalent to party and policy preferences in real elections.  
With mostly student participants, the voters in our study are not representative of the 
general population and likely better able to respond to complex decision tasks. But because the 
decision task requires and depends on cognitive skills as opposed to factors related to the social 
and demographic background of voters, it is highly unlikely that our student participants make 
decisions that are systematically different from the general population. It would obviously be 
desirable to replicate the study with a representative sample. 
A third limit is the artificial construction of the decision task. In real elections, voters are 
usually familiar with the parties and possible coalitions, and they will often be able to use 
experience and additional heuristics to simplify the decision task. For example, even with more 
than four parties running in an election, voters will often identify, with the help of media reports 
and statements by politicians and parties, plausible coalitions based on ideological blocks, 
dramatically reducing the complexity of the decision task.  
The study does not and cannot say anything about a prominent question in the previous 
literature on strategic voting, the number of strategic voters in an election. The purpose of this 
study was rather to test whether voters are able to make optimal vote decisions under ideal 
conditions for strategic voting. By design, participants had an exclusively instrumental (financial) 
motivation to vote and faced election scenarios that, for the most part, required strategic voting to 
obtain the highest payoff. Our study shows that nearly half of the decisions were optimal and 
only less than a fifth of the decisions wrong and costly. The theory of strategic voting clearly has 
something to say about multi-party systems with proportional representation and coalition 
governments, even if a formal model is so far elusive.  
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Figure 1: Simulated Number of Parties in Parliament 
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Note: Each entry (bar) is based on 100,000 simulation rounds. 
 
Figure 2: Simulated Number of Parties in Government 
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Note: Each entry (bar) is based on 100,000 simulation rounds.
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Figure 3: Positive Payoff with Strategic Vote (Simulation) 
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Note: Each entry (bar) is based on 100,000 simulation rounds. 
 
Figure 4: Screenshot of Game 
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Figure 5: Optimal Decisions, Preference Votes, and Decision Time over Time 
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Note: Markers represent percentages or averages for each round. Lines represent the linear 
trend for each series.  
 
Figure 6: Optimal Decisions by Difficulty and Information Sources 
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Note: Bars represent percentages. Due to the random but disproportionate assignment of the poll 
manipulation (independently for each election), the number of participants and vote decisions 
differ for the four models for each election type. Not all participants are represented in all four 
categories. 
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Table 1: Classification of Vote Decisions by Coalition Signals and Poll Information 
 Easy Elections (With Optimal Signal) 
Difficult Elections 
(With Suboptimal Signal) 
 No Poll Signal All No Poll Signal All 
 Info Only Only Info Info Only Only Info 
         
Optimal 51.7 64.2 64.8 67.7 30.9 40.8 21.8 37.6 
         
         
Sincere 39.8 32.3 35.6 34.0 53.9 38.3 52.5 42.8 
Insincere         
- Gain (strategic) 42.8 52.3 51.8 52.8 19.6 32.8 12.9 28.8 
- No effect 4.5 3.7 3.3 2.2 12.3 7.3 11.9 8.5 
- Loss 13.0 11.8 9.3 11.0 14.2 21.6 22.7 19.9 
         
         
N 269 1097 301 1123 408 1651 427 1699 
         
Note: Entries are column percentages. Due to the random but disproportionate assignment of the 
poll manipulation (independently for each election), the number of participants and vote decisions 
differ for the four models for each election type. Not all participants are represented in all four 
categories. 
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Table 2: Vote Decisions by Difficulty and Poll Information 
 Easy Elections  
(With Optimal Signal) 
Difficult Elections 
(With Suboptimal Signal) 
 No Poll With Poll No Poll With Poll 
 
B 
(RSE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B 
(RSE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B 
(RSE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B 
(RSE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Attributes         
Optimal  .529*** 1.70 1.107*** 3.03 .365*** 1.44 .805*** 2.24 
 (.142)  (.080)  (.103)  (.048)  
Signal 1.002*** 2.72 .696*** 2.00 .865*** 2.38 .290*** 1.34 
 (.201)  (.104)  (.155)  (.063)  
Preferred  -.392 .68 -.125 .88 .692*** 2.00 .147* 1.16 
 (.208)  (.118)  (.136)  (.067)  
Distance -.062*** .94 -.035*** .97 -.038*** .96 -.027*** .97 
 (.008)  (.004)  (.004)  (.002)  
Isolated -.175 .84 -.618** .54 -1.196*** .30 -.901*** .41 
 (.420)  (.205)  (.211)  (.085)  
Small -.251* .78 -.709*** .49 .070 1.07 -.721*** .49 
 (.118)  (.080)  (.102)  (.059)  
Constants         
Party A 2.525***  2.636***  2.679***  3.155***  
 (.335)  (.221)  (.307)  (.167)  
Party B 3.166***  2.997***  1.926***  3.255***  
 (.395)  (.235)  (.331)  (.163)  
Party C 2.994***  2.949***  2.537***  3.352***  
 (.377)  (.246)  (.326)  (.166)  
Party D 2.367***  2.135***  2.503***  3.216***  
 (.389)  (.239)  (.332)  (.173)  
         
χ2 371.73  1175.70  360.97  1225.43  
Cluster 259  279  268  279  
N 2850  11100  4175  16750  
         
Note: Entries are conditional logit coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses, and odds ratios. A 
cluster consists of all 125 choice options faced by each voter (25 elections, with 5 choices each). Due to 
the random but disproportionate assignment of the poll manipulation (independently for each election), the 
number of participants and vote decisions differ for the four models. Not all participants are represented in 
all four models. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 3: Optimal Decisions 
 Easy Elections 
(With Optimal Signal) 
Difficult Elections 
(With Suboptimal Signal) 
 
B 
(RSE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
B 
(RSE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
  
Poll .312** 1.37 .503*** 1.65 
 (.095)  (.096)  
Signal .249** 1.28 -.164* .85 
 (.086)  (.067)  
Round (1-25) .000 1.00 .009* 1.01 
 (.006)  (.004)  
Decision Time (5-90) .000 1.00 .008*** 1.01 
 (.003)  (.002)  
Tool Calculator -.590*** .55 .070 1.07 
 (.117)  (.098)  
Tool Party Matrix .261* 1.30 .174* 1.19 
 (.105)  (.083)  
NFC (0-4) .169 1.18 .154* 1.17 
 (.118)  (.072)  
Knowledge (0-13) .043* 1.04 .020 1.02 
 (.018)  (.012)  
Sex (male) .228* 1.26 .107 1.11 
 (.105)  (.079)  
     
Constant -.585  -1.951***  
 (.354)  (.234)  
    
χ2 80.22  112.50  
Cluster 279  279  
N 2790  4185  
  
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses, 
and odds ratios. A cluster consists of all 25 vote decisions made by each voter. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
